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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
To avoid redundancy, Plaintiff/Respondent (Ms. Shubert) will confine her Statement of
the Case to additional facts not contained in the Brief of the Defendants/Appellants Ada County
Public Defender Alan Trimming and Deputy Ada County Public Defender Michael Lojek,
hereafter referred to collectively as the "Ada County Public Defenders," and "Deputy PD Lojek"
in compliance with I.A.R. 35(d).
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

The nature of this case is as presented by the Ada County Public Defenders, other than
the fact that Ms. Shubert disputes that the Ada County Clerks are immune from suit for the errors
made in the underlying criminal cases as represented by Ada County Public Defenders.
However, that is not an issue before this Court on appeal.

B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history relevant to the Ada County Public Defenders' appeal is generally
as stated in their brief. However, contrary to the Ada County Public Defenders' representation,
the finding that the plea agreement and Court order certifications signed by Ms. Shubert did not
evidence her knowledge of the contents of the relevant documents was not made by the District
Court sua sponte. This issue was presented to the District Court by the Ada County Public
Defenders who briefed it extensively (CR 265, 369-370, 390-91, 626-627, 639, 679, 680 687688, 695, 707-709) as did Ms. Shubert (CR 667-669). The District Court considered the signed
"guilty plea advisory forms" ( CR 765-766) noting that"[ d]efendants rely on "certifications"
Shubert signed as evidence that Shubert was on notice that her probation was erroneously
extended." CR 785. The Ada County Public Defenders having placed the issue before the
District Court, the District Court considered it, but rejected their contention, finding that the facts
in the record were insufficient to conclude that Ms. Shubert understood what she was signing:
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1

These "certifications" do not show that Shubett was aware of facts that should have made her
inquire further. The Guilty Plea Advisory Form only shows that she was aware that the
maximum penalty for issuing a check without funds was three years imprisonment and that
under the plea agreement she would receive six years of probation On the GT-601 case and
three years of probation on the NSF-2880 case' There is no indication that she understood
that her probation could be tolled and extended if she was charged with probation
violations.

Memorandum Decision & Order Re: Various Motions, CR 786.

The District Court did not address the Ada County Public Defenders' contract analysis
regarding the documents that Ms. Shubert signed because it was not raised below. Nevertheless,
it is addressed below by Ms. Shubert in case this Court considers that on appeal.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

C[l]

Summary of the Record

The facts contained in the record may be complex, but the issues to be decided by this
Court on appeal can be boiled down to their essence. At all relevant times with respect to the
illegal sentences, Ms. Shubert was represented by Deputy PD Lojek, then an active member of
the Idaho State Bar. Like all public defenders, Deputy PD Lojek represented private clients, and
after the adoption of Idaho Bar Commission Rule 306(a)5 was required that to carry professional
malpractice insurance. Ms. Schubert was sentenced to probation in two cases. Her probation
expired in the first case on February 27, 2012, and in the second case, her probation expired on
April 2, 2014, when Judge Owen commuted her sentence. She was subsequently charged with
and convicted of probation violations in both cases because Deputy PD Lojek repeatedly failed
to recognize that illegal sentences were being imposed extending the period of Ms. Shubert's
probation beyond that which could be imposed by law. As explained by Judge Owen in the
underlying criminal cases, due to illegal orders, Ms. Shubert was unlawfully confined in the Ada
County Jail during 2014-2015 and again in 2016. Hearing Transcript ofMarch 23, 2016, Aug.
p. 4-12.
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C[2]

Ms. Shubert's Background

Ms. Shubert has no legal training, dropped out of high school when she was 15-16 years
old, but did acquire a GED while incarcerated in the Ada County Juvenile Facility. Shubert Deel.

,r 4, CR 171.

During all times that Michael Lojek ("Deputy PD Lojek") represented Ms. Shubert,

Ms. Shubert relied upon him to explain the significance of court orders. Ms. Shubert continues to
rely upon the assistance of her attorneys in this civil lawsuit. Id.

C[3]

February 27, 2009 - the Original Sentencing

Ms. Shubert was represented Deputy PD Lojek on February 27, 2009, when Judge Owen
sentenced her to three years' probation in the Insufficient Funds Case and six years' probation in
the Grand Theft Case. Shubert Deel.

,r 8, CR

171. Deputy PD Lojek represented Ms. Shubert

throughout both cases, other than concerning the motion to correct an illegal sentence filed in the

Insufficient Funds Case in 2016, Shubert Deel.

,r 6, CR 171, after Deputy PD Lojek had left the

Ada County Public Defender's Office. With the exception of the Rule 35 Motion to correct an
illegal sentence, Ms. Shubert communicated exclusively with Deputy PD Lojek during the
pendency of both cases, and she did not communicate with any other member of the Ada County
Public Defender's Office regarding her cases. Shubert Deel.

,r 7, CR

171.

Ms. Shubert was present in the courtroom on February 27, 2009 when Judge Owen
sentenced her to three years' probation in the Insufficient Funds Case, and six years' probation in
the Grand Theft Case. Shubert Deel.

,r 9, CR

171, Judgment of Conviction, Suspended Sentence,

Order of Probation and Commitment entered in the Insufficient Funds Case on March 3, 2009,
CR 184-189; Judgment of Conviction, Suspended Sentence, Order ofProbation and Commitment
entered in the Grand Theft Case on March 3, 2009, CR 190-196. At sentencing on February 27,
2009 Ms. Shubert understood her probation was set to expire at midnight on February 26, 2012
in the Insufficient Funds Case and on February 26, 2015 in the Grand Theft Case. Shubert Deel.
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,r 10-12, CR 171-172, Exhibits 2 and 3, CR 184-196.

She did not, however, understand what

occurred following her initial sentencing on February 27, 2009. Shubert Deel.

,r 14-28, CR

172-

175.

C[4]
February 1, 2011- Probation Violation Charges Resulting in Orders
Illegally Sentencing Ms. Shubert to Probation Ending on May 19, 2017
On or about February 1, 2011 Ms. Shubert was charged with a probation violation. As a
result of those charges, orders were entered in both cases which mistakenly and illegally
extended her probation in both the Insufficient Funds Case and the Grand Theft Case to May 19,
201 7. See, Order Reinstating and Amending Probation (Insufficient Funds Case) entered on May
25, 2011, CR 197-201; Order Reinstating and Amending Probation (Grand Theft Case) entered
on May 25, 2011, CR 202-204; and amended Order Reinstating and Amending Probation
(Grand Theft Case) entered on September 15, 2011. See also the transcript of Judge Owen's

remarks recognizing those mistakes made in open court on March 23, 2016 in Ada County Case
Number CR-FE-2008-2880. Hearing Transcript, Aug. p. 4-12.
To the best of Ms. Shubert's recollection, she does not recall Judge Owen stating that her
probation had been extended or that it would expire at midnight on May 19, 2017 in either case,
nor does she recall Deputy PD Lojek advising her that her probation would expire on May 19,
2017 at that sentencing hearing, or at any subsequent time. Shubert Deel. ,r 14; CR 172. If Ms.
Shubert had been aware that Judge Owen had mistakenly imposed an illegal sentence, she would
have requested that Deputy PD Lojek move for appropriate relief in both cases at that time. Id.
Ms. Shubert does not recall ever seeing copies of the two orders identified as Order(s)
Reinstating and Amending Probation entered May 25, 2011 in the Insufficient Funds Case (CR

197-199) and the Grand Theft Case (CR 202-204), or the Amended Order Reinstating Probation
entered on September 15, 2011 (CR 2005-2007) prior to dismissal of the Insufficient Funds Case.
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Even if Ms. Shubert was shown those orders, her public defender, Deputy PD Lojek, (1) did not
point out that her probation was set to expire on midnight of May 19, 2017, (2) did not advise her
that her probation had been extended, and (3) did not explain to her how this could have
happened. At the time, Ms. Shubert did not understand how the reinstatement of probation
affected her in terms of whether or not the reinstatement had the effect of extending the length of
her probation. Deputy PD Lojek never explained this either. Shubert Deel. ,r 15; CR 172-173.
Had Ms. Shubert been aware that exhibits 4, 5 and 6 to her declaration had imposed illegal
sentences, she would have requested that Deputy PD Lojek move for appropriate relief following
the issuance of those orders. Shubert Deel. ,r 16; CR 173, Ex. 4,5,6; CR 197-207.
As a matter of fact, based on the record, when the Ada County Public Defender's Office
and Deputy PD Lojek were appointed to represent Ms. Shubert, they had a duty to provide Ms.
Shubert effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of her cases, and to make
sure that all sentences imposed in her cases complied with the law. Trimming Depa. p. 43, I. 5
- 24, Aug. p. 252. This duty included the obligation to bring to the attention of the sentencing
court any such errors, and to make a timely motion for relief with respect to any error in
sentencing.
Q. At the time of this April 2, 2014 hearing can you tell me whether in terms of the standards

that you attempted to enforce in your office it was Mr. Lojek's duty to know whether or not
Ms. Shubert was on probation in the Insufficient Funds Case?
A. Yes. We have already discussed ad nauseam about these sequence of orders, and the errors
in the orders that occurred one after another, and it would appear that somebody should
have at least been - the handling attorney, in this instance Mr. Lojek, should have been
aware that something was untoward about those orders. But even an invalid court order is
subject to some force and effect until such time as it is set aside.
Q. So what does that have to do with whether or not your deputies need to know whether

somebody is on probation or not?
A. No, I have already conceded to you that it should have been caught at some point in time
that those orders by the court were erroneously entered.
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Trimming Depo. p. 80 /. 17 - p. 81 /. 11; Aug. p. 261.

Any delegation of the foregoing duties to Ms. Shubert would have breached these
standards. Dennis Benjamin Deel. ,-r 5-7; Aug. p. 16-17. Jonathan Loschi, the Deputy Ada
County Public Defender who took over for Deputy PD Lojek when he left that office, quickly
discovered Lojek's mistake when he reviewed Ms. Shubert's file. He testified that he would not
rely on a client to be able to even understand a written order without assistance of their public
defender and would not even ask the client to review the order for accuracy if it appeared
accurate to the attorney. Loschi Depa. p. 71 /. 15-22.

C[5]
April 23, 2013 - Judge Owen Revokes Ms. Shubert's Probation in
Both Cases
According to the Judgment of Conviction, Suspended Sentence, Order of Probation and

Commitment entered on March 3, 2009 in the Insufficient Funds Case, Ms. Shubert's probation
in the Insufficient Funds Case ended on February 26, 2012. CR 292-297; Shubert Deel. ,-r 17; CR
173. On or about January 4, 2013 motions for a bench warrant and probation violation were
filed in the Insufficient Funds Case and Grand Theft Case. Deputy PD Lojek represented Ms.
Shubert on both violations. Shubert Deel. ,-r 21; CR 174. Deputy PD Lojek apparently failed to
recognize and as demonstrated by the record failed to advise Ms. Shubert or Judge Owen that she
could not be charged with a probation violation in the Insufficient Funds Case since her
probation in that case ended on February 26, 2012. Shubert Deel. ,-r 18; CR 173. Had Deputy PD
Lojek had informed Ms. Shubert that her probation in the Insufficient Funds Case was expired
she would have requested that Deputy PD Lojek take appropriate measures to have the probation
violation and the underlying case dismissed. Shubert Deel. ,-r 22; CR 174.
Nevertheless, on April 23, 2013 the orders Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and

Order Retaining Jurisdiction were entered in both the Insufficient Funds Case and the Grand
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Theft Case pursuant to a probation violation. Judge Owen revoked her probation in both cases
and imposed sentences with credit for time served of 145 days for prejudgment incarceration and
credit for 53 days served in jail prior to sentencing on the first probation violation, and credit for
91 days served prior to sentencing on the second probation violation. Judge Owen then retained
jurisdiction in both cases for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed 365 days. Shubert

Deel. Ex. 7, 8, CR 208-215. Again, Deputy PD Lojek apparently failed to recognize that Ms.
Shubert was no longer on probation in the Insufficient Funds Case. Deputy PD Lojek explained
to Ms. Shubert that the provision for "retained jurisdiction" meant that she would be serving a
"rider." Shubert Deel.

,r 20; CR

173.

C[6]
September 11, 2013 -Judge Owen Illegally Reinstates Probation and
Retains Jurisdiction in the Insufficient Funds Case
After completion of the "rider," Ms. Shubert was released. At hearing on September 11,
2013 Ms. Shubert again appeared before Judge Owen. At that time Ms. Shubert's Sentence in the

Insufficient Funds Case was suspended and probation was reinstated for a period of three years
under the exact same terms and conditions entered on February 27, 2009. Deputy PD Lojek
apparently failed to recognize the fact that Ms. Shubert could no longer be legally on probation
in the Insufficient Funds Case. Deputy PD Lojek again failed to explain to Ms. Shubert that the
probation ordered by Judge Owen in the Insufficient Funds Case expired on February 26, 2012
and that Ms. Shubert was no longer on probation as of that date. Had Deputy PD Lojek so
informed Ms. Shubert, she would have requested that he move to dismiss the Insufficient Funds

Case. Shubert Deel.

,r 23; CR

174.

There were two orders entered the Insufficient Funds Case with respect to the probation
violations of which Ms. Shubert was found guilty. The first was the Order Reinstating

Probation After Retained Jurisdiction entered September 17, 2013 Shubert Deel. ,r 24; CR 174
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7

Ex. 10; CR 221-223.

That order incorrectly states that Ms. Shubert's probation would expire on

September 10, 2016 unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Id. To the best of Ms. Shubert's
recollection Deputy PD Lojek did not discuss Exhibit 10 with her and Ms. Shubert is confident
that he did not advise her that her probation in the Insufficient Funds Case had been extended for
over four years following its expiration on February 26, 2012. Shubert Deel. ,-r 24; CR 174.
The second Order Reinstating Probation After Retained Jurisdiction entered in the
Insufficient Funds Case on October 7, 2013 states that Ms. Shubert's probation would expire at

midnight on February 25, 2015. 1 Shubert Deel. ,-r 23 Shubert Deel. ,-r 24; CR 174, Ex. 11; CR
224-226. To the best of her recollection, Deputy PD Lojek did not discuss Exhibit 11 with her,
and she is confident that he did not advise her that her probation in the Insufficient Funds Case
had been extended for over three years following its expiration on February 26, 2012. Shubert
Deel. 124; CR 174.

Ms. Shubert does not recall being provided with copies of Exhibits 10, 11 and 12 (the
three Order(s) Reinstating Probation After Retained Jurisdiction entered on September 17, 2013,
October 7, 2013 and December 5, 2013, respectively) to review. In any case, even after
reviewing these orders now, the various expiration dates in them, as compared with her original
sentence, are so confusing that without the assistance of an attorney she could not really
understand them. Shubert Deel. ,-r 27; CR 175.
Deputy PD Lojek did not advise Ms. Shubert that there was any discrepancy between the
probation expiration dates of September 10, 2016, February 25, 2015, and February 26, 2015,
contained in Exhibits 10, 11 and 12. Shubert Deel. ,-r 28; CR 175, Ex. 10-12. Ms. Shubert was

1

An Order Reinstating Probation After Retained Jurisdiction was also entered in the Grand Theft Case on
December 5, 2013, Exhibit 12; CR 227-229. That order stated that Ms. Shubert's probation in the Grand Theft Case
would expire on February 26, 2015. Shubert Deel. ,i 26; CR 175.
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not aware of these discrepancies, or that the expiration dates contained in Exhibit 10 and 11
mistakenly stated that her probation in the Insufficient Funds Case expired after the end of the
probation that had been ordered in that case. Had Ms. Shubert been aware that Exhibits 10 and
11 entered in the Insufficient Funds Case ordered an illegal sentence, she would have requested
that Deputy PD Lojek move for appropriate relief at that time. Id.
C[7]
April 4, 2014 -Judge Owen Revokes Probation, Imposes Sentence
And Commutes Sentence To Ada County Jail With Credit For Time Served In
The Grand Theft Case.
On April 2, 2014, Ms. Shubert appeared before Judge Owen in the Grand Theft Case
with Deputy PD Lojek and was sentenced with respect to a motion for probation violation filed
on February 24, 2014.
Prior to the April 2, 2014 Court appearance, Ms. Shubert advised Deputy PD Lojek that
she wanted to leave Idaho and go to Texas. Ms. Shubert advised Deputy PD Lojek that her
grandmother had written a letter to Judge Owen requesting that she be permitted to go to Texas
to live with her and to help care for her niece who also lived there. Deputy PD Lojek advised
Ms. Shubert that Judge Owen would not allow her to go to Texas and that he would likely
impose sentence. Nevertheless, Deputy PD Lojek argued that Ms. Shubert should not be
returned to jail, but rather be permitted to join her grandmother and her brother in Corpus Christi
Texas. Transcript, Aug. p. 221-237 at 228.
Deputy PD Lojek's argument prevailed. At the hearing in that case Judge Owen made it
clear that he was not reinstating probation in the Grand Theft Case and that he was terminating
her probation and ordering Ms. Shubert released as of that date, declaring "This case is at an
end." Aug. p. at 235. Judge Owen also observed at that time "In all, you have spent almost a
year in jail on this case. And the only reason you are not here on this other case is you only have
three years' probation in that other case, again, another case involving checks." Aug. p. 234. On
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April 4, 2014, Judge Owen entered his Order Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence and

Commuting Sentenced to Ada County Jail with Credit for Time Served in the Grand Theft Case.
Shubert Deel. Ex. 19, CR 258. Obviously, Ms. Shubert was no longer on probation after April 2,
2014.
Given Judge Owen's ruling, and his statements at the time of the hearing, Ms. Shubert
planned to go to Texas. Whether or not Judge Owen called both cases at the time that he
commuted Ms. Shubert's sentence in the Grand Theft Case, and simply failed to enter an order
identical to Exhibit 18 in the Insufficient Funds Case, Shubert Deel. Ex. 18, CR 253-257, he
certainly made it clear that he believed that Ms. Shubert was no longer on probation in the

Insufficient Funds Case. Given Ms. Shubert's understanding that she was no longer on probation
in either case, on or about April 4, 2014 she left to live her grandmother in Texas. Shubert Deel.

,r 32, CR

176.
C[8]

June 2014 - Ms. Shubert's Alleged Probation Violation

Ms. Shubert's understanding, acquired in early June 2014, was that sometime around the
beginning of June 2014 Ms. Shubert learned from her mother that her probation officer, Christine
Martindale, had contacted her and advised her that Ms. Shubert was in violation of her probation.
Having been advised of this by her grandmother, Ms. Shubert called Christine Martindale who
asked what her residence was. Ms. Shubert told her that she was living in Texas. Christine
Martindale told Ms. Shubert that she had absconded, because she was still on probation.
Christine Martindale did not advise Ms. Shubert which case she had allegedly violated her
probation in. Ms. Shubert told Christine Martindale that this was not what Judge Owen had told
her when she appeared in Court, but Christine Martindale said that Ms. Shubert was still on
probation according to her paperwork, and that she needed to take this up with her attorney.

Shubert Deel. ,r 34, CR 176-177.
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Relying upon what Ms. Martindale told Ms. Shubert, she returned to Idaho. A Motion for

Probation Violation was filed on or about June 29, 2014. Shubert Deel. Ex. 16, CR 244-247.
The report of probation violation was prepared by Christine Martindale Shubert Deel.

,r 34, , CR

176-177; Ex. 17, CR 248-252. Ms. Shubert contacted Deputy PD Lojek and explained to him
that there was some confusion and asked him to do whatever was necessary to correct it. Ms.
Shubert explained to him that she did not believe she was on probation. Shubert Deel. ,r 35, CR
177. Deputy PD Lojek advised Ms. Shubert that this was just a result of a clerical mistake and
that he would take care of it. Shubert Deel. ,r 36, CR 177.
Apparently completely forgetting Judge Owen's ruling at the hearing on April 2, 2014,
Deputy PD Lojek advised Ms. Shubert that the probation violation was only on one case number.
Deputy PD Lojek advised Ms. Shubert that he was going to file a motion to have the probation
violation dismissed. Shubert Deel. ,r 38.

C[9]

July 23, 2014 - Ms. Shubert Is Illegally Incarcerated

Ms. Shubert was arrested and incarcerated on July 23, 2014 in connection with the
alleged probation violation in the Insufficient Funds Case and remained incarcerated until
December 10, 2014. Shubert Deel. ,r 40 Ex. 18. Deputy PD Lojek never came to see her, though
he represented her in connection with that probation violation and appeared before Judge Owen.

Shubert Deel. ,r 41. Ms. Shubert requested that Deputy PD Lojek take action on her behalf to
correct the mistakes that had occurred in her case. Shubert Deel. Ex. I, CR 181-183. Ms.
Shubert continued to languish in jail.

C[lO]
January 19, 2015 - Ms. Schubert Contacts Deputy PD Lojek
Requesting His Assistance Regarding Her Illegal Sentence
Ms. Shubert emailed Deputy PD Lojek on January 19, 2015 and explained to him that
she had spoken with her probation officer, Christine Martindale, on January 16, 2015 at which
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11

time Christine Martindale showed Ms. Shubert documentation concerning her probation
violation for which she was sentenced in April 2014. Ms. Shubert explained to Deputy PD Lojek
that it was her understanding that her sentences were to run concurrently in the Insufficient

Funds Case and Grand Theft Case and that Christine Martindale advised there was a "mix up."
Shubert Deel. 143, CR 177-178; Ex. 1, CR 181-183. Deputy PD Lojek responded to Ms.
Shubert' s January 19, 2015 email stating "Awesome. Thanks for following up with her on your
end; it ought to really help!" Shubert Deel. 144, CR 178; Ex. 1, CR 181-183.

C[ll]
January 29, 2015 - Ms. Schubert Again Contacts Deputy PD Lojek
Again Requesting His Assistance Regarding Her Illegal Sentence
Ms. Shubert again emailed Deputy PD Lojek on January 29, 2015 and explained that she
had spoken with Christine Martindale on the morning of January 29, 2015 concerning the letter
that Ms. Shubert had received from Deputy PD Lojek. Ms. Shubert explained to Deputy PD
Lojek that Ms. Martindale had told her that she understood that both of her cases were to run
concurrently and that someone should be able to just contact Judge Owen or central records,
indicating that he should do so. Shubert Deel. 145, CR 178.

C[l2]
February 9, 2015 - Ms. Schubert Again Contacts Deputy PD Lojek
Again Requesting His Assistance Regarding Her Illegal Sentence
Ms. Shubert again emailed Deputy PD Lojek on February 9, 2015 and advised him that
she was confused. ("I havent (sic.) done anything to get violated for?? Im (sic.) so confused??")
By this point in time Ms. Shubert was completely confused, because her understanding was that
both cases had been commuted in April of 2014, so it made no sense to her that she would still
have been on probation. Shubert Deel. 146, CR 178.

C[13]
April 8, 2015 - Ms. Schubert Once Again Contacts Deputy PD Lojek
Again Requesting His Assistance Regarding Her Illegal Sentence
On April 8, 2015 Ms. Shubert emailed Deputy PD Lojek asking him to please put in a
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request to Judge Owen to discharge her felony probation. ("Mike can we please put (sic.) in a
request to owed (sic.) to discharge my felony probation yet??") Shubert Deel. Ex. 1, CR 181183.

C[14]
Defendant Respondent Lojek Takes No Action To Correct Ms.
Schubert's Illegal Sentence
There is no indication that Deputy PD Lojek made any attempt to review the paperwork
relating to Ms. Shubert's cases or make any attempt to correct what Ms. Martindale had referred
to as a "mix up." Shubert Deel. ,r 47, CR 178. Ms. Shubert relied on Deputy PD Lojek to
investigate whether or not she should have been on probation when she was charged with a
probation violation in June 2014. To the best of her knowledge, Deputy PD Lojek never filed a
motion to discharge her probations in either case and did not put in a motion to correct the "mix
up" of which she had advised him. Shubert Deel. ,r 49, CR 178.

C[l5]
March 11, 2016 - Ms. Shubert Is Arrested Again For An Alleged
Probation Violation
On March 11, 2016, Ms. Shubert was again arrested on an alleged probation violation in
the Insufficient Funds Case and incarcerated in the Ada County Jail from March 11, 2016 to
March 21, 2016. Shubert Deel. Ex. 19, CR 258. See, Ada County Sheriff's Office Jail Booking

Sheet. Shubert Deel. ,r 29; CR 175, Ex. 18; CR 253-257.
C[16]

The County Public Defenders' Omissions Become Apparent

At that time, Ms. Shubert still did not understand what was going on with the Insufficient

Funds Case and the Grand Theft Case, but fortunately, Ms. Shubert was assigned a new public
defender, Jonathan Loschi, ("Deputy PD Loschi") who thoroughly reviewed her files. Based on
that review, it was obvious that Ms. Shubert should have been released from probation a number
of years earlier. Deputy PD Loschi stated that he figured out there was an issue with Ms.
Shubert's case "when I first picked the case up." Loschi Depa p. 14 /. 18-20 - p. 15 l. 1-8, Aug. p.
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323. The issue was evident to Deputy PD Loschi from the file, and he didn't even need to speak
with Ms. Shubert. Id. Deputy PD Loschi quickly determined an illegal sentence had been
imposed by understanding and applying simple legal concepts like the applicable maximum
sentence for a specific crime to determine the maximum period of probation, and using that
simple information to spot a clear clerical error, that Ms. Shubert had been reinstated on
probation in 2011, but that probation was set to expire in 2011. Laschi Depa p. 17 l. 11-25 - p.
18 /. 1-6, Aug. p. 323-324. Deputy PD Loschi also testified that an illegal sentence was imposed
against Ms. Shubert and that an attorney familiar with the orders in the case should have caught
the mistake. Laschi Depa p. 37 l. 19-25 - p. 38 /. 1-18, Aug. p. 324-325. Deputy PD Loschi
immediately filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence which was granted by Judge Owen on
March 24, 2016, Exhibit 20, and the Insufficient Funds Case and Grand Theft Case were
dismissed on that date. Shubert Deel. ,-r 43, CR 177-178; Ex.I, CR 181-183. Ex. 21, CR 261; Ex.
22, CR 262.
Indeed, Deputy PD Lojek's negligence throughout his representation of Ms. Shubert is
demonstrated by circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. Deputy PD Loschi, the
Public Defender who picked up Ms. Shubert's file after Deputy PD Lojek resigned his position,
determined immediately that she had been illegally sentenced and filed an Idaho Criminal Rule
35 motion for relief. Laschi Depa. p. 14 l. 18-25 - p. 15 /. 1-8, Aug. p. 323. There was no reason
for a lawyer with familiarity with the file not to see that the sentence Ms. Shubert received in the

Insufficient Funds Case was illegal. Laschi Depa. p. 37 l. 19-25 - p. 38 l. 1-18, Aug. p. 328-329.
The Ada County Public Defenders' negligence and recklessness are clear in the record.
Q. Do you think Mr. Lojek exercised due diligence when he, when and if he reviewed the order of
May 25th, 2011 and failed to notice it misstated the expiration date of Ms. Shubert's
probation in the insufficient funds check case as being May 19, 2017?

THE WITNESS: I believe that it should have been caught, yes.
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Trimming Depa p. 43 l. 25, 44 l. 1-4 - p. 45 l. 18-19, Aug. p. 252.
Deputy PD Loschi testified that it is important as a public defender to check and review
orders when they come in, Loschi Depa p. 59 l. 7-18 - p. 60 l. 1-25, Aug. p. 334, but that there
was no established policy for reviewing orders in the Ada County Public Defender's Office.

Loschi Depa p. 30 l. 23-25 - p. 31 l. 1-9, Aug. p. 327. The Ada County Public Defenders'
failings were virtually inevitable since they also had no formal procedure at the Ada County
Public Defender's Office for reviewing orders for accuracy as they came in, Loschi Depa. p. 70 l.
9 - p. 71 l. 1, Aug. p. 337, and there was no supervision to make sure that deputy attorneys were
checking orders for accuracy, Loschi Depa. p. 71 l. 3-7, Aug. p. 337.
Deputy PD Loschi testified that the first thing a public defender should do when assigned
a probation violation is review the file and go back through the history of the judgments to figure
out the relevant time periods, determine whether the court has jurisdiction over a public
defender's client, whether the client can be charged or pursued. Deputy PD Loschi testified that
this is important because if there is an allegation of a parole violation while the client is alleged
to be on probation, it is important to know for how long the accused was placed on probation,
and it also helps to figure out the worst-case scenario that the client is facing, what sentence is
hanging over the client's head, and how much credit the client has. Loschi Depa p. 66 l. 21-25 -

p. 67 l. 1-25 - p. 68 l. 1-3, 23-25 - p. 69 l. 1-4, Aug. p. 336.
II.

IRCP 56 STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review on appeal is the

same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Davison v. Debest Plumbing,

Inc., 163 Idaho 571, 574, 416 P.3d 943, 946 (2018) (quoting Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho
434,436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008)). Summary judgment is only appropriate if the pleadings,
affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the
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nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw. Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683, 685, 183 P.3d 771, 773 (2008). If
the evidence reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact, then all that remains is a question
oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. Id. at 685-86, 183 P.3d at 773-74. Dickinson

Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., No. 45580, 2019 Ida. LEXIS 81, at *9 (May 3, 2019).
On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court it "liberally construes the facts and existing record
in favor of the non-moving party" in making such determination." Hall v. Fors/off, 124 Idaho
771, 773, 864 P.2d 609, 611 (1993). "If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or
inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141
Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact rests at all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v.

Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). To meet its burden, the moving party
must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact on an element of the nonmoving party's case. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc.,
126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). If the moving party fails to challenge an
element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
on that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the non-moving party is
not required to respond with supporting evidence. Id. Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2,
918 P.2d 583, 588, (Idaho 1996).
The Court construes the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Avila v. Wahlquist, 126
Idaho 745,747,890 P.2d 331,333 (1995).
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III.

ISSUES ADDRESSED

Though the Ada County Public Defenders' brief does not contain a division under the
heading "Issues Presented On Appeal," as required by I.A.R. 35, the following issues (as stated
by the Ada County Public Defenders in the Procedural History section of their brief on appeal)
are presented in this brief in the order in which they are discussed below:
1.

Are public defenders entitled to immunity pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-904?

2.

Does the unambiguous language in Idaho Code section 6-904A exempt public defenders
and Ada County from liability?

3.

Are public defenders entitled to immunity under the common law?

4.

Is a criminal defendant presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a court document
when she signs and certifies [sic.] a court document?

IV.

ARGUMENT
QUESTION PRESENTED: DOES IDAHO CODE§ 6-904(1) IMMUNIZE IDAHO
A.
PUBLIC DEFENDERS? ANSWER: NO.
A[l]

Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) Is Not Applicable To The Facts Of This Case

The Idaho Tort Claim Act provides:
LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES - DEFENSE OF EMPLOYEES. (1) Except as otherwise
provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages
arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its
employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties, whether
arising out of a governmental or proprietary function, where the governmental entity if a
private person or entity would be liable for money damages under the laws of the state of
Idaho, provided that the governmental entity is subject to liability only for the pro rata share
of the total damages awarded in favor of a claimant which is attributable to the negligent or
otherwise wrongful acts or omissions of the governmental entity or its employees.
Idaho Code§ 9-603. Emphasis supplied. 2

2

Under Idaho Code§ 9-603 a governmental entity, but for any express exception granting immunity, is
liable because a private attorney will be liable for legal malpractice. To establish a claim for attorney
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The purpose of the ITCA is to provide "much needed relief to those suffering injury from the
negligence of government employees." Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 214, 723 P.2d 755,
758 (1986) (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 165, 83 S. Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed. 2d
805 (1963)) (superseded on other grounds by statute, I.C. § 6-904A, as noted by Harris v.
State, 123 Idaho 295, 301, 847 P.2d 1156, 1162 (1992)). The ITCA is to be construed
liberally, consistent with its purpose, and with a view to "attaining substantial justice." Id. at
214-15, 723 P.2d at 758-59. Therefore, under the ITCA liability is the rule and immunity is
the exception. Id.

Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397, 406 (2006). Emphasis supplied.

The Ada County Public Defenders argue that they are immune from liability under Idaho
Code§ 6-904(1), which provides:
EXCEPTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY. A governmental entity and its employees while acting
within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall
not be liable for any claim which:
1. Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity exercising
ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a statutory or
regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the
discretion be abused.

Emphasis supplied.
Application of this exception to governmental liability for negligence requires a four-part
factual inquiry to determine: (1) whether the Ada County Public Defenders were "governmental
employees" within the meaning of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, (2) whether the Ada County
Public Defenders were acting without malice or criminal intent, (3) whether the Ada County
Public Defenders were acting in reliance upon the execution or performance of a statutory

malpractice arising out of a civil action, the Plaintiff must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship;
(2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or the standard of care by the
lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate cause of the damages suffered by the
client. Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 p.2d 350, 352 (1991); Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 p.2d
650 (1982). At least for purposes of this appeal, there can be no real question that the Ada County Public
Defenders committed legal malpractice damaging Ms. Schubert. There also can be no question that a private
attorney is liable for legal malpractice for the omissions upon the basis of which Ms. Shubert seeks relief.
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regulatory function, and (4) whether the Ada County Public Defenders were engaged in the
performance of the discretionary function or duty at the time of the negligent acts and omissions
that caused Ms. Shubert's damages.
A[2]
Public Defenders Should Not Be Considered "Governmental
Employees" for Purposes of the Idaho Tort Claims Act

The Ada County Public Defenders cite Sterling v. Bloom for the proposition that since
judges are immune from liability in exercising a discretionary function, Deputy PD Lojek should
be equally immune. Again, the Ada County Public Defenders provide no Idaho authority for this
proposition. This argument fails like the Ada County Public Defenders' argument for general
immunity, based on a lack of authority in Idaho.
It is by no means conceded that public defenders are "governmental employees" within

the meaning of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. First, the record does not establish that all public
defenders in Idaho are employed by a governmental entity, as opposed to contracting with the
governmental entity to provide legal services. Indeed, the powers and duties of the Idaho Public
Defense Commission include the promulgation of rules establishing "model contracts and core
requirements for contracts between counties and private attorneys for the provision of indigent
defense services" and the review of defense attorneys for compliance with "contractual
provisions." Idaho Code§ 19-850 -- "Powers and duties of the state public defense
commission." See, generally, Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 394 P.3d 54 (2017).
Second, the Ada County Public Defenders moved to dismiss Ms. Shubert's civil rights
claim because public defenders are not "state actors" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. CR 714. It is
passing strange that the Ada County Public Defenders take the contradictory position that they
are agents of the state for purposes of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, but not for purposes federal
civil rights laws. The purpose of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is to protect those acting on behalf
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 19

of the state.
In deciding this issue, the District Court relied upon the logic of the United States
Supreme Court in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 314 (1981), a case in which the Plaintiff
filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against his former public defender alleging that she failed to
adequately represent him in his appeal. In Polk, the United States Supreme Court stated:
This assignment [of defense of an accused to a public defender] entailed functions and
obligations in no way dependent on state authority. From the moment of her appointment,
Shepard became Dodson's lawyer, and Dodson became Shepard's client. Except for the
source of payment, their relationship became identical to that existing between any other
lawyer and client. "Once a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused, the
duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or
serving in a legal aid or defender program." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.9 (2d ed.
1980).

*

*

*

[l]t is the function of the public defender to enter "not guilty" pleas, move to suppress
State's evidence, object to evidence at trial, cross-examine State's witnesses, and make
closing arguments in behalf of defendants. All of these are adversarial functions. We find it
peculiarly difficult to detect any color of state law in such activities.

*

*

*

[A] public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other
employees of the State. Administrative and legislative decisions undoubtedly influence the
way a public defender does his work. State decisions may determine the quality of his law
library or the size of his caseload. But a defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his
function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior. Held to the same standards of
competence and integrity as a private lawyer, see Moore v. United StatesJ 432 F.2d 730 (CA3
1970), a public defender works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his
exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client. "A lawyer shall not permit a
person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to
direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services." DR 5-107(8),
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1976).
Second, and equally important, it is the constitutional obligation of the State to respect the
professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages. This Court's
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), established the right of state criminal
defendants to the "'guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
[them]."' Id., at 345, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Implicit in the
concept of a "guiding hand" is the assumption that counsel will be free of state
control. There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an effective
and independent advocate. See, e. g., Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Holloway v. Arkansas,
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435 U.S. 475 (1978). At least in the absence of pleading and proof to the contrary, we
therefore cannot assume that Polk County, having employed public defenders to satisfy the
State's obligations under Gideon v. Wainwright, has attempted to control their action in a
manner inconsistent with the principles on which Gideon rests.

Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S. Ct. 445, 449-52 (1981 ). Emphasis supplied.
Given the observations of the United States Supreme Court, it is difficult to see how
public defenders are "an employee of the governmental entity" within the meaning of Idaho
Code§ 6-904(1). For practical purposes, public defenders are only paid by a governmental
entity, and they are not entitled to immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904(1 ).

A[3]
The Exception Contained Within Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) Is Limited To
Public Employees Executing Or Performing A Statutory Or Regulatory
Function Or Exercising Discretionary Functions
As observed by this Court, Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) is sometimes referred to as the
"discretionary function" exception to liability. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 488, 903 P .2d
73, 77 (1995). It applies to governmental decisions entailing planning or policy formation:
There is a two-step process for determining the applicability of this exception. Ransom v.
City of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 205, 743 P.2d 70, 73 (1987); City of Lewiston v. Lindsey,
123 Idaho 851, 856, 853 P.2d 596, 600 (Ct. App. 1993). The first step is to examine the
nature and quality of the challenged actions. Id. "Routine, everyday matters not requiring
evaluation of broad policy factors will more likely than not be 'operational."' Ransom, 113
Idaho at 205, 743 P.2d at 73. Decisions involving a consideration of the financial, political,
economic and social effects of a policy or plan will generally be planning and
"discretionary." Id. "While greater rank or authority will most likely coincide with greater
responsibility for planning or policy formation decisions; ... those with the least authority
may, on occasion, make planning decisions which fall within the ambit of the discretionary
function exception." Id.at 204, 743 P.2d at 72. The second step is to examine the
underlying policies of the discretionary function, which are: to permit those who govern to
do so without being unduly inhibited by the threat of liability for tortious conduct, and also,
to limit judicial re-examination of basic policy decisions properly entrusted to other
branches of government. Id. at 205, 743 P.2d at 73.

Dorea Enters. v. City ofBlaclifoot, 144 Idaho 422,425, 163 P.3d 211,214 (2007). Emphasis
supplied.
Applying this test, the omissions of the Ada County Public Defenders constituting
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negligence in the representation of Ms. Schubert were clearly "operational" and not within the
scope of the exception to liability contained within Idaho Code§ 6-904(1). Consequently,
whether the Ada County Public Defenders were exercising "ordinary care" is moot, because
Idaho Code § 6-904(1) does not apply in this case.
To the extent that Idaho Code§ 6-904(1) requires construction by this Court, construction
urged by the Ada County Public Defenders does not give effect to the obvious intent of the
legislature to protect governmental entities from liability for the acts and omissions of their
employees and entities, as opposed to simply protecting government coffers from having to
indemnify those, as here, paid by the government but not acting on their behalf.
When the Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the
legislative intent, and give effect to that intent. Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29, 382
P.2d 913, 915 (1963). To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal
words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public
policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. at 29-30, 382 P.2d at 915-16.

State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).

A[4]
Even if I.C. § 6-904(1) Does Apply In This Case, Deputy PD Lojek
Failed To Exercise Ordinary Care In Handling Ms. Shubert's Case
Deputy PD Lojek's reckless lack of ordinary care is demonstrated clearly in the record.
The representation of Ms. Shubert by the Ada County Public Defenders unquestionably fell far
below the standard of care for public defenders, as demonstrated by the testimony of the Ada
County Chief Public Defenders themselves. See, Statement ofFacts, supra, generally, and
particularly the section entitled "The County Public Defenders' Omissions Become Apparent."
See, also, Benjamin Deel.

lr 10.

If LC. 6-904(1) is applicable, the record before this Court is sufficient to preclude
summary judgment because there is no evidence that Deputy PD Lojek exercised ordinary care
in handling Mr. Shubert' s cases, and there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to
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whether he acted recklessly. Currently, there is no basis upon which this Court can hold the Ada
County Public Defenders immune under LC. § 6-904(1) as a matter oflaw.
B.
QUESTION PRESENTED: DOES THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN IDAHO CODE
SECTION 6-904A(2) EXEMPT PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND ADA COUNTY FROM LIABILITY?
ANSWER: No.
The Ada County Public Defenders also rely on Idaho Code§ 6-904A(2) as the basis for
the claim of their immunity. In pertinent part, this section provides:
Idaho Code§ 6-904A. EXCEPTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY. A governmental entity and its
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and without
malice or criminal intent and without reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in
section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which:

*

*

*

2. Arises out of injury to a person or property by a person under supervision, custody or care of a
governmental entity or by or to a person who is on probation, or parole, or who is being
supervised as part of a court imposed drug court program, or any work-release program, or
by or to a person receiving services from a mental health center, hospital or similar facility.

Emphasis supplied.
B[l]
As Noted by the District Court, Idaho Code§ 6-904A Was Not
Enacted to Prevent Governmental Entities from Liability to a Person on
Probation
In ruling on Ada County Public Defenders' Motion For Summary Judgment on the issue
of immunity, the District Court observed:
All the Idaho cases interpreting Idaho Code§ 6-904A(2) deal with third party injury claims where
the person that injured them was "under supervision, custody or care of a governmental
entity" or was on probation. Those cases note that "[u]nder I.C. § 6-904A(2) the State
generally enjoys immunity from suits in which a person is injured by another under the
supervision of the State." Smith v. Bd. of Corr., 133 Idaho 519, 522, 988 P.2d 1193, 1196
(1999). "Section 6-904A(2) was intended to provide immunity to the State from the
'unpredictable acts of third persons' who are under the 'state's custody, supervision and
care."' Id. at 523, 988 P.2d at 1197 (1999) (citing Harris v. State Dep 't of Health & Welfare,
123 Idaho 295, 299, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1992). "This limitation of liability is based upon
the status of the person causing the injury, not the status of the person injured." Moreci v.
Coeur D'Alene Sch. Dist. No. 271, 150 Idaho 740, 743, 250 P.3d 791, 794 (2011); Coonse ex
rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 806, 979 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1999) ("It is clear
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that the immunity arises from the status of the person(s) causing the injury, not the status
of the person injured.").

*

*

*

In passing the 2004 revisions to Idaho Code§ 6-904A, the legislature indicated that the bill is meant
to provide liability protection to probation and parole officers, not to immunize an attorney
for malpractice claims. See 2004 Idaho Laws Ch. 227 (S.B. 1416).

Memorandum Decision & Order Re: Various Motions, CR 735. Emphasis supplied. The
District Court's analysis of the application ofldaho Code§ 6-904A was undeniably correct, and
the Ada County Public Defenders are not provided immunity under that statute.

B[2]
Even If Idaho Code§ 6-904A Covered Injuries to a Person on
Probation, At Most There Are Issues of Fact As to Whether Ms. Schubert Was
on Probation at the Time of the Negligence that Caused Her Damages
It is likely that the tortious omissions of the Ada County Public Defenders that damaged

Ms. Schubert occurred both while she was lawfully on probation, (see,p. 4 supra "February 1,
2011 - Probation Violation Charges Resulting in Orders Illegally Sentencing Ms. Shubert to
Probation Ending on May 19, 2017") and continued after the period during which she was
lawfully on probation. Assuming that the omissions of the Ada County Public Defenders in
repeatedly failing to recognize and failing to move to correct mistakes in orders, unwarranted
charges of probation violation, and the entry of illegal orders or continuing tort, the tortious
conduct occurred both while Ms. Schubert was on probation and thereafter.
As we have indicated previously, the definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires that there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the
emotional distress, and the emotional distress must be severe. Evans~ 118 Idaho at 220, 796
P.2d at 97. By its very nature this tort will often involve a series of acts over a period of time,
rather than one single act causing severe emotional distress. For that reason we recognize
the concept of continuing tort, as it was originally applied in Farber, should be extended to
apply in other limited contexts, including particularly intentional infliction of emotional
distress. We note, however, that embracing this concept in the area of intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress does not throw open the doors to permit filing
these actions at any time. The courts which have adopted this continuing tort theory have
generally stated that the statute of limitations is only held in abeyance until the tortious
acts cease. See, e.g.~ Page, 729 F.2d at 818, and Twyman v. Twyman 790 S.W.2d 819
(Tex.App.1990). At that point the statute begins to run. If at some point after the statute has
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run the tortious acts begin again, a new cause of action may arise, but only as to those
damages which have accrued since the new tortious conduct began.

Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 604, 850 P.2d 749, 755 (1993). The underlying principles of the
continuing tort theory logically apply here with respect to the application of Idaho Code § 6904A to the continuing failure of the Ada County Public Defenders recognize and move to
correct in the orders entered in 2011 and thereafter the illegal extension of Ms. Schubert's terms
of probation beyond that allowed by law contained. This reckless conduct commenced in 2011
and continued into 2016.
Ms. Schubert was not legally on probation in the Insufficient Funds Case after February
26, 2012 (see,p. 3 supra) on February 26, 2012, and her maximum period of probation ended on
February 26, 2015 in the Grand Theft Case. Shubert Deel. ,r 10-12, CR 171-172, Exhibits 2 and
3, CR 184-196. Based on Judge Owen's rulings in the underlying criminal cases, Ms. Schubert
was not on probation after April 2, 2014. See,p. 9, supra. As demonstrated, even ifldaho Code
§ 6-904A were interpreted contrary to the plain language of the statute to provide immunity with
respect to injuries to probationers, Ms. Schubert was not legally on probation in the Insufficient
Funds Case at the time of the Ada County Public Defenders' omissions resulting in her
subsequent illegal incarcerations. Nevertheless, in addition to failing to detect the errors in the
orders entered while she was on probation, Deputy PD Lojek failed to recognize the error in
charging Ms. Schubert with a probation violation in the Insufficient Funds Case after probation
ended in that case.
As noted by Deputy PD Loschi, who discovered Deputy PD Lojek's mistakes and
corrected them, there were really two mistakes with respect to the September 17, 2013 Order
Reinstating Probation after Retaining Jurisdiction entered in the Insufficient Funds Case ( CR
221-223) because (1) it never should have been entered, because Ms. Schubert was not on
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probation, and (2) because, even if she was on probation, her probation could not have been
extended to September 10, 2016, because that would have exceeded the maximum permissible
sentence for the violation of the statute under which she was convicted. Loschi Depo. p. 40 l. 24
- p. 42 l. 9. It is clear from the record that the same mistake was made with respect to the Order
Revoking Probation, Imposing Sentence an Order Retaining Jurisdiction entered in the
Insufficient Funds Case on April 23, 2013, CR 208-211; and the Order Reinstating Probation
after Retaining Jurisdiction entered in the Insufficient Funds Case on October 7, 2013, CR 224-

226. As stated by Judge Owen at the hearing on Deputy PD Loschi's Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence which took place on March 23, 2016:
... on April 4, 2014, I revoked your probation in that case and commuted your sentence out, and so
at that point, both of these cases should have been at an end, but I have learned in
reviewing both of these files that your probation was continued in the case that it should
never have been continued in. And at some point in - at some point this month you were
arrested on a probation violation.

Transcript ofHearing ofMarch 23, 3016, Aug. p. 10-11.

Thus, with respect to his representations of Ms. Schubert regarding any alleged probation
violations occurring after February 26, 2012 in the Insufficient Funds Case and April 4, 2014 in
the Grand Theft Case, Deputy PD Lojek cannot assert protection under Idaho Code§ 6-904A,
because she was not legally on probation. Clearly, at all times following April 4, 2014, Ms.
Schubert was not on probation in either the Insufficient Funds Case or the Grand Theft Case. As
such, Idaho Code§ 6-904A does not immunize the Ada County Public Defenders for negligence
occurring after those relevant dates, even if it arguably provides for immunity for injuries
committed by a probationer upon third parties. For this reason, summary judgment based on
Idaho Code§ 6-904A is improper, and this issue is frivolous.
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B[3]
Assuming Only For Purposes Of This Issue That Ms. Schubert Was A
Person On Probation For Purposes Of Idaho Code § 6-904A, The Ada County
Public Defenders Remain Liable For Their Reckless Conduct
Even if Idaho Code § 6-904A does apply for any time relevant to this case, it does not
immunize reckless behavior resulting in injury to a person on probation. Idaho Code§ 6-904A
provides:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their
employment and without malice or criminal intent and without reckless, willful and wanton
conduct as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which:
2. Arises out of injury to a person ... or by or to a person who is on probation, or parole. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Idaho Code§ 6-904C provides:
1. "Gross negligence" is the doing or failing to do an act which a reasonable person in a
similar situation and of similar responsibility would, with a minimum of
contemplation, be inescapably drawn to recognize his or her duty to do or not do such
act and that failing that duty shows deliberate indifference to the harmful
consequences to others.
2. Reckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person intentionally
and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to
another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As demonstrated above, and as recognized by Judge Owen, Ms. Schubert was not a
person legally on probation in either case after April 4, 2014, Transcript ofHearing ofMarch 23,
2016, CR 132-138 at 136, and was not on probation in the Insufficient Funds Case after February
26, 2012. Therefore, Idaho Code§ 6-904A, on which the Ada County Public Defenders rely,
does not apply. Even assuming that Ms. Schubert was a person on probation at the time of his
omissions, whether Deputy PD Lojek's actions were reckless is a question of fact for a jury.
The record at least presents an issue of fact regarding recklessness on the part of Deputy
PD Lojek, since it is clear that he failed to take any action to correct the illegal sentence leading
to the illegal incarceration of Ms. Schubert when asked by her to do so, and because there is at
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least circumstantial evidence that he intentionally and knowingly failed to review for court
orders. Nothing in the record supports the proposition that Deputy PD Lojek review the orders,
recognize that the sentences imposed were illegal, but that it simply slipped his mind to take any
action to remedy this problem.
There is at least circumstantial evidence that Deputy PD Lojek did not even bother to
review the written orders issued illegally extending Ms. Shubert's probation to May 19, 2017.
Deputy PD Lojek testified that he did not have a general practice of checking court orders for
accuracy. Lojek Depa. p. 50 l. 12 - p. 51 /. 21, Aug. p. 292. Though Deputy PD Lojek
supervised attorneys in the Ada County Public Defender's Office ( Lojek Depa. p. 15 /. 13 - p. 16
l. 10, Aug. p. 341-342), he testified that there was no protocol in the office to do a file review.
Lojek Depa. p. 40 l. 1 - 7, Aug. p. 290. Deputy PD Lojek testified that he received no specific

training regarding the importance of reviewing orders after judges issued a decision. Lojek
Depa. p. 84 /. 5-17. Aug. p. 301. See, also, testimony of Ada County Public Defender Alan

Trimming. Trimming Depa. p. 16 l. 9- 14, Aug. 245. Deputy PD Lojek could not recall any
protocol or any supervisor that helped with the review of orders or trained lawyers to review the
orders. Lojek Depa. p. 84 /. 5 - p. 85 /. 8, Aug. p. 301. The only standard of care that Deputy PD
Lojek was able to articulate at the time of his deposition was, "my standard was to get my clients
out of custody and make the case go away." Lojek Depa. p. 81 l. 15 - p. 82 /. 24, Aug. p. 300. It
is doubtful that any court would admit an expert witness's opinion that legal malpractice was
committed because an attorney violated applicable standards by failing to "get [his] clients out of
custody and make the case go away," much less find it sufficient evidence to withstand a motion
for summary judgment.
Deputy PD Lojek disagreed that one might have to be a lawyer to really fully understand
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court orders sent to clients involving statutes, codes, and legal words. Lojek testified that he
relies on his clients to be a second set of eyes to help him catch any errors or mistakes in such
court orders. Lojek Depo. p. 48 l. 15 - p. 50 l. 3, Aug. p. 292. Based upon his testimony, Deputy
PD Lojek intentionally and knowingly relied on his client to understand court orders and advise
him of errors and mistakes. To the extent that he did this without reviewing those orders
himself, as here, he knowingly created an unreasonable risk of harm to Ms. Schubert constituting
recklessness as defined by Idaho Code § 6-904C. Indeed, his prolonged pattern of inattention to
the details of Ms. Schubert's case was reckless given the obvious need of individuals not trained
in the law to rely on their attorneys to understand and advise them concerning court proceedings.
Deputy PD Lojek testified that he relied heavily on his clients to be up to date on their
case to "collaborate" with him. Yet, it does not appear that this "collaboration" amounted to
much. After Ms. Shubert returned from Texas in 2014 and advised Deputy PD Lojek that she
believed she should not be on probation, Shubert Deel. ,-r 35, CR 177, Lojek advised Shubert
that this was a "clerical mistake," and that he would "take care of it" Shubert Deel. ,-r 36, CR 177.
He did not do that. Deputy PD Lojek was repeatedly contacted by Ms. Schubert regarding the
concerns that she was wrongfully incarcerated, leading her to believe that he would follow up on
this information, but he never took any action to do so. See,p. 11 - p. 13, supra.
Apparently, as a matter of routine, Deputy PD Lojek did not ask his clients whether they
could read, write and understand the English-language, what their reading level was, or if they
had gone to high school. Lojek Depo. p. 42 l. 22 - p. 43 l. 12, Aug. p. 290. Relying on the client
to understand and detect errors in court orders without such knowledge is reckless.
Deputy PD Lojek's failures to review the relevant orders and to follow up on Ms.
Schubert's requests that he take action to determine what mistakes had been made and to correct
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them carried with them a high degree of probability that Ms. Shubert would be injured. Ms.
Schubert was injured by being forced to endure months in jail under an illegal sentence when she
was wrongfully accused of probation violations that went uncontested by Deputy PD Lojek.
Given Deputy PD Lojek's description of his procedures, there is at least circumstantial evidence
raising issues of fact as to whether he (1) intentionally and knowingly failed to review orders that
imposed illegal sentences on Ms. Shubert, and (2) intentionally and knowingly failed to take the
actions required and requested by Ms. Schubert to remedy her legal incarceration and have the
illegal sentences corrected.
Ms. Shubert contacted Deputy PD Lojek and explained to him that she did not believe
she was on probation. Shubert Deel. ,-r 35, CR 177. Deputy PD Lojek advised Ms. Shubert that
this was just a result of a clerical mistake and that he would take care of it. Shubert Deel. ,-r 36,

CR 177. In April 2014, Ms. Shubert requested via email that Deputy PD Lojek do something to
address the issue and discharge her felony probation. Shubert Deel. Ex. I, CR 181-183. Deputy
PD Lojek failed to act, as he told Ms. Shubert he would, and nothing happened until Deputy PD
Loschi took over Ms. Shubert's case, detected an obvious error amounting to illegal sentence,
and essentially immediately filed the Rule 35 motion for release. Loschi Depa 14 l. 18-20, 15 l.
1-8, Aug. p. 323. Whether Deputy PD Lojek knowingly and intentionally refused to act, or
simply recklessly failed to review the court's order knowing that an error in an order can deprive
an individual of freedom, or simply failed to timely take the necessary steps to correct Ms.
Schubert's illegal sentence is a question of fact for a jury to determine, and summary judgment
on this basis is improper.
The foregoing leads to the conclusion that the Ada County Public Defenders are not
entitled to immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904A because Ms. Schubert was not a person on
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probation whose claim is subject to Idaho Code§ 6-904A, and because the Ada County Public
Defenders behaved recklessly as defined by Idaho Code§ 6-904C.
C.
QUESTION PRESENTED: ARE PUBLIC DEFENDERS ENTITLED To IMMUNITY
UNDER THE COMMON LAW? ANSWER: No.

C[l]
Idaho Should Not Adopt Absolute Immunity For Public Defenders Is
A Part Of Its Common Law
In Idaho there no legislation, statutory authority or stare decises entitling Public
Defenders to absolute or qualified immunity from suit.
As the District Court noted:
Here, the asserted theory of liability on the part of the Public Defenders is novel and is an issue of
first impression in Idaho. The Ada County Defendants have failed to bring cases to the
Court's attention or articulate compelling reasons as to why the Court should extend judicial
immunity to the Public Defenders in this case.

CR62.
Nevertheless, the Ada County Public Defenders invite this Court to extend governmental
immunity to public defenders as a matter of judicial policy.

C[2]

Scenarios Relevant To This Court's Consideration Of Judicial Policy

Although the facts in the record evidence a complete miscarriage of justice and the
consequences flowing from it, the Ada County Public Defenders' would have this Court as a
matter of judicial policy simply tell Ms. Schubert "tough luck." The long and detailed discussion
of the complex set of facts contained in the Clerk's Record and the Augmented Record are
certainly illustrative of the reasons that public defenders should not be held immune from suits
for legal malpractice. Likely of equal importance to this Court are the myriad foreseeable
scenarios in which the immunities advocated by the Ada County Public Defenders would lead to
injustice that, as a matter of judicial policy, militate against immunity for public defenders.
As a simple example, should this Court answer yes to the questions posed to it by the Ada
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County Public Defenders (1) a public defender defending an innocent accused (2) executed
based on a wrongful conviction of murder (3) resulting from the public defender's negligent
failure to introduce testimony from numerous alibi witnesses of undisputed facts exonerating the
accused (4) would not be liable for professional negligence resulting in wrongful death of the
accused to the accused's minor heirs. Such a hypothetical factual scenarios should be taken into
consideration in determining the judicial policy of the state of Idaho.

C[3]
The Argument That The Judicial Policy Of The State Requires The
Recognition Of Immunity For Public Defenders Is Belied By This Court's
Adopted Rules
This Court's adopted rules appear to manifest a contrary judicial policy. The Idaho Bar
Commission Rule 306(a)5, as adopted by order of this Court, carries with it the implication that
it is the judicial policy of the state of Idaho that public defenders are liable for professional
malpractice. Idaho Bar Commission Rule 302(a)(5) requires active members of the Idaho State
Bar to "certify to the Bar (A) whether the attorney represents private clients; 3 and (B) if the
attorney represents private clients, submit proof of current professional liability insurance
coverage . . . ." The term "private clients" is not defined by the Idaho Bar Commission Rules,
Idaho cases, or Idaho statutes. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that it is the status of the client that
determines whether or not malpractice insurance is required and not the status of the individual
or entity who pays the attorney. Public defenders representing private clients clearly fall within
the requirements of IBCR 302(a)(5), and consistent with this Court having adopted that rule
requiring them to carry malpractice insurance, it may be presumed that they are legally liable for
committing professional malpractice. Were this not the case, there would be no reason for the

3

"Public defenders represent individual clients rather than the government itself; State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694, 706-07, 215 p.3d 414, 426-27 {2009)." Eby v. State, No. 39301, 2013 Ida. App. Unpub. LEXIS
118, at *10-11 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2013). Emphasis supplied.
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requirement that they carry malpractice insurance. Whether or not the Ada County Public
Defenders, or any other public defenders in Idaho, have complied with IBCR 302(a)(5) is not at
issue. Unlike judges and prosecutors, public defenders represent private clients. Idaho attorneys
in active practice representing private clients are required to carry insurance for legal
malpractice. It follows that this Court, has by implication declared as a matter of policy that
public defenders are liable for the professional malpractice.

C[4]
Announcing Immunity For Public Defenders As A Part Of Idaho's
Common-Law Should Not Be Adopted As A Matter Of Public Policy
Even if this Court did not intend to include public defenders as those liable for
professional malpractice in adopting Idaho Bar Commission Rule 302, absolute immunity for
public defenders should not be adopted as a matter of judicial policy. The scope of
governmental immunity adopted by statute has been addressed by Idaho's legislature as
discussed below. That being the case, this Court's prior opinions suggest that there is no need
for this Court to declare a common-law immunity based on public policy:
"We must recognize, however, that the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability
underlies a very broad field and that the legislative process and procedures can be more
effectively applied to a comprehensive solution, while the court's processes and procedures
are more effectively directed to a solution more narrowly limited to specific facts framed in
litigated cases." .

Citation omitted. Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 805-06, 473 P.2d 937, 947-48 (1970).
The Ada County Public Defenders argue that Idaho's Public Defenders should be
immune from liability for professional malpractice because "prosecuting attorneys are immune
from liability for activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."

Nation v. State, Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 187, 158 P.3d 953, 963 (2006).
It is apparent that a prosecutor has no attorney-client relationship but rather an arm's
length relationship with the accused, whereas a public defender is bound by an attorney-client
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relationship. Defendants-respondents analogizing the role of a public defender to the role of a
public prosecutor is inapt. A public prosecutor owes no duty of confidentiality to the defendant;
a defendant's public defender does owe that duty. A public prosecutor owes no general duty to
keep a defendant advised; a defendant's public defender does owe that duty. A public prosecutor
as special responsibilities imposed upon her by Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8; this
rule does not impose those duties on a defendant's public defender. The commentary to this rule
states:
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This
responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence and that special
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.

In contrast, a public defender's duty to an accused is strictly to act as an advocate. Any
other duty would create a conflict of interest. Certainly, if it were otherwise, a public defender
could decide to abandon a viable defense "for the public good" just as a prosecutor can decide to
dismiss a viable case in the interest of justice.
The Supreme Court of the United States has cautioned that absolute immunity should be
granted sparingly. Absolute immunity is only sparingly recognized for state actors. Forrester v.

White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed. 2d 555 (1988). It should not be extended
"further than its justification would warrant." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811, 102 S. Ct.
2727, 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982). The United States Supreme Court in Imbler discusses the
circumstances which justify absolute immunity for prosecutors:
"The office of public prosecutor is one which must be administered with courage and
independence. Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom
he accuses and fails to convict? To allow this would open the way for unlimited harassment
and embarrassment of the most conscientious officials by those who would profit
thereby. There would be involved in every case the possible consequences of a failure to
obtain a conviction. There would always be a question of possible civil action in case the
prosecutor saw fit to move dismissal of the case .... The apprehension of such consequences
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would tend toward great uneasiness and toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy
which should characterize the administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor
would thus be impeded and we would have moved away from the desired objective of
stricter and fairer law enforcement." Pearson v Reed 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287, 44 P.2d 592,
597 (1935).

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423-24, 96 S. Ct. 984, 991-92 (1976).
C[5]
Prosecutorial Immunity Was Granted In Idaho For Reasons Not
Applicable To Public Defenders
While prosecutors have a duty to the public, a public defender has a duty limited to his or
her client. This Court has stated the reasons for its grant of prosecutorial immunity:
Idaho has never recognized absolute prosecutorial immunity, but absolute prosecutorial immunity
was recognized at common law. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423-24. This absolute immunity is
based on public policy. Fear of harassment by "unfounded litigation" could cause a
"deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he
would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by
his public trust." Id. at 423. Therefore, in order to have unimpeded prosecutors who
administer their duties with "courage and independence" we afford them
absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial functions. Id.

Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 187-88, 158 P.3d 953, 963-64 (2007). In contrast, a public
defender's duty cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the duty of any active attorney as to
any private client. As discussed herein, that duty is solely to the client, and is not a "public
trust." In short, an argument in favor of granting absolute immunity for public defenders based
upon analogizing their roles in the system to public prosecutors is not supported by the facts.

C[6]
The Limited Number Of States Granting Of Immunity To Their
Public Defenders Of Done So For Reasons That Should Be Unpersuasive To
This Court
The Ada County Public Defenders next argue that since other states like New York and
New Mexico have granted immunity to public defenders that Idaho should do so. First, this
Court has made it clear that "changes in public policy should come from the legislature. Anstine

v. Hawkins, 92 Idaho 561, 563, 447 P.2d 677, 679 (1968)." In re Chaney, 126 Idaho 554, 559,
887 P.2d 1061, 1066 (1995). Consistent with this rule oflaw, this Court, as a matter of judicial
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policy, yields to legislative policies expressed in Idaho statutes. See, e.g., Idaho State AFL-CIO

v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 725, 718 P.2d 1129, 1163 (1986). Policy in the area of governmental
immunity has been expressed clearly by Idaho's legislature. As noted above, the Idaho
legislature has considered "the injustice created by the doctrine of sovereign immunity" (Smith v.

State, 93 Idaho 795, 808, 473 P.2d 937, 950 (1970)), has abolished it, and "therefore, under the
ITCA liability is the rule and immunity is the exception." Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137
P.3d 397, 406 (2006). Nevertheless, the Ada County Public Defenders argue that despite the
legislature already having acted in this field, if public defenders are not included within the
exemptions to the abrogation of sovereign immunity contained in the Idaho Tort Claims Act, this
Court should declare them to be so as a matter of common law. To do so would be contrary to
this Court's well-established judicial policy of deferring to the legislature and, for this reason
alone, this Court should decline the invitation to be guided by what appears to be a minority of
jurisdictions which have granted public defenders immunity on their common law.
Those states granting immunity as a matter of common law the public defenders appear
to do so for reasons significantly different from those intended to protect discretionary charging
decisions made by public prosecutors. It would appear that the primary reason for granting
immunity to public defenders and not private attorneys is to protect the assets of governmental
entities. This spurious justification for judicial overreaching in the name of policy has been laid
bare previously in Idaho:
[W]e have no authority to override the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing access to
the courts for bringing tort suits against the state. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter
in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 67, 76 S.Ct. 122, 125, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955),
we are not the self-constituted guardians of the public purse empowered to import
sovereign immunity into a statute designed to waive it. The legislature is the primary
guardian of the public purse and we have no authority to override its determination that the
government will be liable for its torts. Everton supra, 468 So.2d at 946.
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Ransom v. Garden City, (Bistline concurring) 113 Idaho 202, 217-18, 743 P.2d 70, 85-86 (1987).
Significantly other states have denied immunity to public defenders for persuasive
reasons. In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court refused to extend immunity to
public defenders when a former public defender client was convicted of and incarcerated for
bank robbery and brought a legal malpractice action against the deputy public defender after
obtaining a judicial determination of factual innocence. The California Supreme Court held (1) a
public defender's actual representation of a client generally does not involve discretionary acts
within meaning of discretionary act immunity statute, and (2) a public defender's decision not to
file motion for disclosure of identity of a confidential informant was not a discretionary act
protected by discretionary act immunity. Barner v. Leeds 24 Cal. 4th 676, 13 P.3d 704 (2000).
The Barner court also ruled in the absence of bad faith, a public employee-including a deputy
public defender-who is sued personally, based on the performance of his or her duties, may
obtain both defense and indemnity from the employer, which is vicariously liable for the torts of
its employees. See§§ 815.2, subd. (a), 825 et seq.; Caldwell, supra, IO Cal.4th at pp. 980-981,
42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, Deel. ,-r.) "Hence, fears that personal exposure to damage suits and
judgments would deter the vigorous performance of public responsibilities are no longer a policy
basis for immunity. [Citation.]" (Caldwell, supra, IO Cal.4th atp. 981, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842,897
P.2d 1320.) Finally, a deputy public defender's exposure to liability for legal malpractice is
circumscribed by the requirement that a defendant in a criminal action must prove his or her
actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence before prevailing on a claim against his or
her attorney for negligent representation in the criminal proceeding. ( Wiley v. County of San

Diego, 19 Cal.4th at p. 545, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 966 P.2d 983 (1998)) Barner 24 Cal. 4th 676,
691 (2000).
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Pennsylvania has followed California in denying immunity to public defenders. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held:
We are called upon here by the appellees to read into a statute implementing a constitutionally
prescribed duty to furnish indigents with court-appointed counsel, an unexpressed public
interest in limiting liability for professional malpractice visited upon indigents thus
represented. We are asked to rule that this potential liability outweighs the interest of the
indigent client in the provision of legal services under the same standards as those
applicable in other attorney-client situations. Appellee's contention is tantamount to a
suggestion that we distinguish between groups of Plaintiffs based on economic status, thus,
denying an indigent the tort relief which would be available to the paying client in a similar
fact situation. Such a distinction would raise troublesome equal protection questions were
we to adopt it.

Reese v. Danforth 48 PA 479, 486,406 Pa. 735 (1979). Emphasis supplied.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to extend immunity to public defenders since doing so
would deny an indigent client the same set of rights as someone who had the money to hire
private counsel, the right to sue their attorney for malpractice when committed.
Michigan courts have also denied immunity to public defenders for similar reasoning. A trial court
rejected a court appointed public defender1 s argument that public defenders enjoy qualified
immunity from suits for malpractice in their conduct of the defense. The Michigan Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court decision, ruling:
Further, when we reflect on the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, we are reminded of the words of the late Justice Black who, in Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), stated: "(t)here can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has11 •
In light of the foregoing well-established principles of law, we decline to draw a distinction
between appointed and retained counsel in criminal cases when it comes to questions of
malpractice. The United States Constitution and our own principles of fairness lead us to
affirm the trial court.

Donigan v. Finn, 95 Mich. App. 28, 30,290 N.W. 2d 80 (1980). Emphasis supplied.

Multiple other courts have held that public defenders are not entitled to immunity. See,
e.g., Briggs v. Lawrence, 281 Cal. Rptr. 578, 581 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Defendants do not and

cannot assert that as public defenders they would be individually immune from liability for
malpractice."); Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 740 (Pa. 1979) (public defenders "do not serve
as public administrators with policy-making functions" and therefore under state law
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do not receive immunity); see also, Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 873 (Conn. 1975)
("While it need not decide if and to what extent a public defender enjoys immunity as an
"employee" of the state, this court must conclude that the immunity conferred and the liability
assumed by the state under chapter 53 was not intended to extend to the acts and omissions of a
public defender which arise during the course of the attorney-client relationship and over which
the state has no right of control."); see also, Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80, 81 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980) (finding that court-appointed counsel are not immune from malpractice liability
when defending an indigent client); See Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not preclude an action against
the office of the public defender by a former client);
Additionally, many states permit legal malpractice actions against attorneys appointed to
represent criminal defendants. See Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237 (Ala. 1983); Shaw v.

Public Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991); Rose v. Hudson, 153 Cal. App. 4th 641,
63 Cal.Rptr.3d 248 (Cal. App. 2007); Pearson v. Sublette, 730 P.2d 909 (Colo. App. 1986);

Johnson v. Gibson, 837 So.2d 481 (Fla. App. 2002); Herron v. Mixon, 157 Ga. App. 224,276
S.E.2d 893 (Ga. App. 1981); Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577 (Iowa 2003); Canaan v.

Bartee, 276 Kan. 116, 72 P.3d 911 (Kan. 2003); Law v. Mayeux, 527 So.2d 37 (La. App. 1988);
Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074 (Me. 1995); Smith v. Sneed, 638 So.2d 1252 (Miss. 1994);
Johnson v. Raban, 702 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. App. 1985); Delbridge v. Office of Public Defender,
238 N.J. Super. 288, 569 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. 1989) (non-criminal case in which the court held
that appointed counsel had immunity from suit except for legal malpractice, conspiracy, or other
intentional misconduct.); Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F.Supp. 1451 (D. N.J. 1989) (applying New
Jersey law); Britt v. Legal Aid Soc., Inc., 95 N.Y.2d 443, 741 N.E.2d 109, 718 N.Y.S.2d 264
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(N.Y. 2000); Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Ore. 221, 851 P.2d 556 (Or. 1993); Moore v. McComsey,
313 Pa. Super. 264,459 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. 1983); Peterson v. White, 877 S.W.2d 62 (Tex.
App. 1994); Taylor v. Davis, 265 Va. 187, 576 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 2003); Powell v. Associated

Counsel for Accused, 125 Wn. App. 773, 106 P.3d 271 (Wash. App. 2005).
Though some states afford immunity to public defenders, Idaho should not become one
of them, both because to do so would violate this Court's judicial policy of deferring to the
legislature in fields in which it has acted, and because doing so would make judicial policy,
undermining the reasons for this court adopting rules requiring attorneys representing private
clients to carry professional malpractice insurance and, potentially, creating equal protection
problems.

C[7]
The Holding In McKay v. Owens Granting Quasi-Immunity To
Guardians Ad Litem Should Not Extend To Public Defenders
In Idaho, there has been no legislation, statutory authority or stare decises entitling public
defenders to immunity from suit. Recognizing that, the Ada County Public Defenders offer this
Court an analogy to the role of a guardian ad !item. The Ada County Public Defender' argue that
guardians ad !item acting as an "arm of the court" are entitled quasi-immunity under the logic of

McKay v. Owens 130 Idaho 148, 156, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997). However, McKay contains
language refuting the over-broad application of that case as precedent for this case: "[A ]t least in
custody matters, [where] the guardian ad !item has traditionally been viewed as functioning as
an agent or arm of the court, to which it owes its principal duty of allegiance, and not strictly as
legal counsel to a child client." citing State ex rel. Bird v. Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376, 384
(Mo.App.1993). Emphasis supplied.
The Ada County Public Defenders' analogy is fallacious because a guardian ad !item
performs a totally different function than a public defender. Attorneys representing the
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criminally accused do not owe the court a principal duty of allegiance, but rather are "strictly"
legal counsel for the criminally accused. Obviously, all attorneys are "officers of the court."
Yet, while there is no authority in Idaho for a cause of action against a guardian ad !item acting
as an "arm of the court," Idaho has long recognized the cause of action against attorneys for legal
malpractice. See, for example, Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982).
If this Court were to extend quasi-immunity to public defenders based upon the rationale
contained in McKay, it would be logical to extend it to all attorneys on the same basis. Such an
extension of quasi-immunity would almost certainly violate judicial policy and would not be in
the public interest. Therefore, public defenders should not be immune from civil liability, as a
matter of public policy, under the common law.
D.
QUESTION: Is A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT PRESUMED To HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF
THE CONTENTS OF A COURT DOCUMENT WHEN SHE SIGNS AND CERTIFIES A COURT
DOCUMENT? ANSWER: No-NOT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE

As noted by the District Court:
It is a traditional lawyer function to review judgments and orders signed by the Court to determine
their accuracy. The three incorrect Judgments that Defendants contend imposed notice on
the Plaintiff, were not effective to impose claim-precluding notice upon Plaintiff, because (1)
a reasonably prudent person would believe that their attorney would review and ensure
that the signed Judgments/Orders conformed to the Court1s oral ruling, and (2) since the
Judgements/Orders were all illegal, Shubert1s attorney was in the best position to know that
fact and would have an affirmative duty to take proper curative action. Shubert has the
right to rely on the premise that her lawyer is the legal expert, charged with an affirmative
duty to protect her interests, and as long as nothing adverse has resulted, to trust that the
job was done properly.

Memorandum Decision and Order, CR 165. Notwithstanding this fact, the Ada County Public
Defenders argue that a criminal defendant who signs the statement put in front of them that they
have read and understood in order is conclusively presumed to have done so.
The Ada County Public Defenders rest this argument on this Court's prior opinions
analogizing a probation agreement to traditional contract terms and governmental contracts.
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This argument assumes that the court orders provided to Ms. Schubert were the equivalent of
probation agreements. They were not. First, even if a contractual analogy were to be applied to
Ms. Schubert circumstances, various aspects of contract law undermine the application of that
analogy to court documents. Assuming that a document stating that someone has read and
understood a court order is analogous to a probation contract, numerous defenses should, in
fairness, be available to a criminal defendant who is the victim of her attorney's negligence. As
but one example focusing on the contractual analogy, any "probation contract" signed by Ms.
Schubert incorporating an illegal sentence would be based on a mutual mistake, therefore not
enforceable under contract law. See, O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188
P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 4
Second, to fully comprehend the injustice of the Ada County Public Defenders position,
it may be useful for it to consider the implication of their argument. If it is true that an individual
is irrevocably bound by the terms of a court document if she signs a statement "certifying" that
she has read and understood that document, then an illiterate criminal defendant wrongfully
sentenced to a life sentence for a crime that carried a maximum of one year in jail could not
bring a malpractice action against her public defender for failing to recognize and move to
correct an error leading to years of unlawful incarceration and misery imposed under an illegal
sentence. It is doubtful that this absurd result is compelled by judicial policy.
The Ada County Public Defenders argue at page 35 of their appellate brief that Ms.
Shubert is "presumed to have knowledge of the contents of court orders, and, more specifically,
that all of Ms. Shubert's certification's including the four detailed [by the Ada County Public

4

[M]utual mistake permits a party to rescind or modify a contract as long as the mistake is so substantial

and fundamental as to defeat the object of that party." Primary Health NetworkJ Inc., 137 Idaho at 668, 52 p.3d
at 312 {citing United States v. Fowler, 913 F.2d 1382 {9th Cir. 1990)).
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Defenders], indicate her knowledge of the contents of the records she signed." Even assuming
that Ms. Schubert's certification that she has knowledge of the records that she signed is binding
upon her on that issue, there is no reason in law or logic for her to be conclusively presumed to
have understood what she signed. Such a legal presumption, the Ada County Public Defenders
should be aware, is not compelled by this Court's holding in the Idaho case that they cite in
support of their argument. In State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 p.2d 1295 (1987) while this
Court did recognize, for purposes of the facts of that decision only, the analogy of a waiver of the
requirement of a warrant to search a house to an agreement to a contract provision, it expressly
noted:
In State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 239, 697 P.2d 1253 (Ct.App.1985), it was held that the issue of
voluntary knowing and intelligent waivers is essentially a factual issue turning on the
accused's state of mind, and lending itself to resolution by the trial court. Here, Gawron has
made no allegation that his signature and acceptance of the order and conditions of
probation were involuntary or done unintelligently.

State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987).

Furthermore, while this Court did cite 17 Am. Jur. 2nd, Contracts, Section 347 (2004) for
the proposition that "the law presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract and
that they had the intention which its terms manifest," J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611,
614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006), it did not announce that such a presumption was irrebuttable. If
it were, a contract could never be set aside on the grounds of a mutual mistake, and a waiver
could not be set aside because it was done "unintelligently" or on other applicable grounds.
In this case, it is Ms. Shubert' s position that all of the relevant documents which she
signed alluded to by the Ada County Public Defenders were signed unintelligently, precisely
because of the negligence of the Ada County Public Defender's Office and Deputy PD Lojek.
While this Court may continue to analyze probation contracts by analogy to contract law,
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it should not extend this analogy to every document signed in a criminal court proceeding by a
criminal defendant. The documents in question are not contracts, but rather are, at most, prior
inconsistent statements that could may be used to impeach Ms. Shubert at trial if admitted by the
District Court.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ada County Public Defenders' issues on appeal are without merit for the reasons
stated above. The decisions of the District Court should be affirmed denying the Ada County
Public Defenders relief based on their arguments urged in this appeal. This case should be
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its decision.
Dated May 26, 2019.
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